

To DD/P fr Ch/Adm Br/DPD

"Up to the time of the Hanson Baldwin article appearing in the 29 May issue of the Sunday New York Times, in which specific reference was made to a U-3 successor to the U-2, press reaction to the U-2 incident, in terms of its effect on the intelligence collection capability of the United States, had been divided into roughly two categories: These were:

- a) Newspapers and periodicals who regarded the U-2 incident as marking "the end of the era of manned reconnaissance and the start of the era of satellite reconnaissance." The launching of the first successful MIDAS satellite, occurring as it did in the midst of the whole U-2 business, appeared to further signify such a demarcation. In effect, these people were writing off manned reconnaissance as too risky in the light of the Soviet attitude of intransigence over the U-2 border violation.
- b) Commentators and writers who saw in the demise of the U-2 the end of an extremely useful project well before the time when a reliable satellite reconnaissance capability would be in being. Emphasis shifted rapidly from talk about our "missile gap" to talk about what was described as an "intelligence gap". This group estimated that it would be near the end of 1962 before satellite reconnaissance would be in a

NRO review(s) completed.

position to supply even part of the wealth of detail possible in the U-2. Both groups, however, appeared willing to concede that satellite reconnaissance offered less potential cause for international complaints, since national sovereignty concepts are ill-defined at the altitudes required by orbiting vehicles.

The position taken by the first group appears to offer greater possibilities for O cover than the second. If the defense establishment acts in such a manner that emphasis is placed on speeding up development of satellite reconnaissance vehicles, and talk about a higher performance, manned reconnaissance aircraft is officially dropped ~~and talk about a higher performance, manned reconnaissance aircraft is officially dropped,~~ development of O could proceed largely in the wings rather than on center stage.....

I fear that if some such step (as going through an overt cancellation of O within the circle of CIA and Defense in a manner similar to the "cancellation" of the U-2 some years ago) is not undertaken without delay, and if the Defense Dept. does not posture itself in such a manner as to support the idea that manned reconnaissance is a thing of the past, we are quite apt to find ourselves standing in the midst of a wholly exposed Project O. Your comments and guidance are earnestly invited.

J.A.C., Jr.